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ABSTRACT 
The conventional wisdom about conditionals claims that (1) conditionals that have non-
assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, are not plausibly 
interpreted as material implications; (2) the most promising hypothesis about those sentences 
is conditional-assertion theory, which explains a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., 
a performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis has 
far-reaching and revisionist consequences, because conditional speech acts are not 
synonymous with a proposition with truth conditions. This paper argues against this prevalent 
view in two steps. First, it presents a battery of objections against conditional-assertion 
theory. Second, it argues that those examples can be convincingly interpreted as categorical 
assertions of material implications. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Conditionals are tricky. They constantly defy our linguistic intuitions, because they are used 
to represent reality, but they are also inferential in nature. This dual nature becomes weirder 
when the main clause is the sort of non-assertive act because it seems to disregard the little 
knowledge we have about conditionals. One way to explain these puzzling sentences is 
conditional-assertion theory. According to this theory, A → B  is synonymous with the 1
performance of a speech act B given the assumption of A. This hypothesis tries to offer a 
unified account of conditional sentences independently of whether or not the speech act in the 
main clause is an assertion or not. The elegance of conditional-assertion theory is usually 
presented in contrast with the material account of conditionals, which asserts that A → B is 
logically equivalent to a material implication. The material account, accuses the critic, seems 
old-fashioned in comparison, and it is too rigid to be generalised to different conditional 
speech acts. This paper will argue that is possible to offer a unified material account of 
conditionals that is less revisionist and more elegant than conditional-assertion theory.   
The many attractions of conditional-assertion theory and the allegedly inadequacy of the 
material account will be presented in section 2. A battery of objections against the 
conditional-assertion theory is presented in sections 3-6. In section 3 it is argued that 
conditionals cannot be plausibly interpreted as conditional speech acts. Instead, conditional 
sentences are better interpreted as categorical statements of a relation between the antecedent 
and the consequent. Because there are many similarities between conditional-assertion theory 
and the Ramsey test, it will be argued in section 4 that the conditional-assertion theory 
 Here ‘→’ stands for indicative conditionals, ‘⊃’ stands for material conditional and ‘⊨’ stands for entailment. I 1
will not use quotes to highlight the use-mention distinction when there is no risk of confusion, and the symbols 
and variables quoted will be modified to ensure that the notation remains uniform.
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inherits the Ramsey test flaws. The accusation that the conditional-assertion theory eliminates 
the objectivity of conditionals is made in section 5. In section 6, the argument that the 
triviality result reinforces the conditional-assertion theory is criticised. It is offered a different 
interpretation of the result that is less revisionist. The counter-examples to the material 
account involving conditional speech-acts are explained away in section 7. This  results in a 
material account that can be generalised to different conditional speech acts. Finally, the 
paper concludes with some observations about the state of the discussion.  
2. THE LURE OF CONDITIONAL-ASSERTION THEORY 
Usually, when we think about ‘if’ sentences in conditional theory their main clause is an 
assertive act (‘If you strike the match, it will light’, ‘If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone 
else did’, ‘if the train is on time, we’ll be home by ten’). Conditional assertives, however, 
represent only a small portion of conditional sentences, which may be as varied as 
conditional interrogatives (‘If he calls, what shall I say?’), conditional warnings, (‘If you go 
to New York, watch out for the taxi drivers’), conditional requests (‘If you’re going out 
anyway, could you please pick up some Dos Equis?’), conditional commands (‘If the patient 
is still alive in the morning, change the dressing’), and conditional bets (‘If Parasite is a 
nominee for best picture, I bet you $100 it will win an Oscar’), to name just a few.  
Conditional-assertion theories were craftily designed to explain all those sentences in an 
elegant and intuitive fashion. Conditional-assertion theories state that any given conditional A 
→ B is tantamount to the performance of a speech act B given an assumption A . In this 2
interpretation, B can be any kind of speech act (e.g., an assertion, a command, a request, etc.) 
and A can be any kind of assumption about the world (e.g., the satisfaction of a condition, the 
occurrence of a fact, etc.). The conditional speech act is only fulfilled if the speech act in the 
consequent is performed when the antecedent is true. If the antecedent turn out to be false, 
the conditional speech act is null. Take for instance the conditional bet, ‘If Parasite is a 
nominee for best picture, I bet you $100 it will win an Oscar’. If the antecedent happens to be 
false and the film doesn’t win an Oscar, I don’t have to pay you $100 because the bet only 
holds if Parasite was a nominee for best picture. 
One of the most surprisingly features of conditional-assertion theory is its non-
propositional requirement . The theory states that A → B is just a conditional act of B given 3
A. Thus, it is not a proposition with truth values, much less a connective that combines two 
propositions to produce an additional proposition whose truth values are determined by its 
propositional constituents . Thus, if B is an assertive act, A → B is used to conditionally 4
assert that B given A . This puts conditionals in an entirely new light. Instead of being seen as 5
 This intuition was first suggested in very crude terms by Quine (1950: 19), who credited Philip Rhinelander 2
with the idea.
 Some of the main proponents of the theory are Appiah (1985), Edgington (1986, 1995), Barker (1995), Woods 3
(1997); Derose (1999) and Derose & Grandy (1999).
 Derose & Grandy (1999: 407).4
 Derose & Grandy (1999: 407).5
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static truth-functions, conditionals are now portrayed as action movements in natural 
language .  6
The proponents of conditional-assertion theory present a variety of arguments to reinforce 
the sui generis character of conditionals. One of these arguments is that other speech acts that 
occur in the main clause of conditionals (e.g., warnings, questions, commands, etc.) cannot 
be combined with conjunctions and disjunctions. For instance, there is an obvious difference 
between the conditional warning, ‘If you go to New York, watch out for the taxi drivers’, and 
the following conjunction ‘You are going to New York and watch out for the taxi drivers’, 
and the disjunction ‘You are not going to New York or watch out for the taxi drivers’. The 
difference is that both the conjunction and the disjunction with the warning seem 
ungrammatical or at least inappropriate . 7
But the most compelling defence of conditional-assertion theory to date was advanced by 
Dorothy Edgington (1986; 1995). Edgington’s view is motivated by a series of arguments, 
including the adaptation of the probabilistic logic of Ernest Adams (1965; 1975) in order to 
present a compelling alternative logic where conditionals can be interpreted as conditional 
speech acts. This adaptation is reinforced by arguments about the uncertain nature of 
conditional judgments and the triviality results. Our basic intuitions about conditionals 
whose consequents are assertions attribute to them the structure of conditional probability. 
Intuitively, the degree of confidence in the conditional ‘If this match is struck, it will light’ is 
measured by the probability that I attribute to the occurrence of being lighten given that it 
was struck. If the conditional probability is high, I accept the conditional. If the conditional 
probability is low, I refuse the conditional. Consequently, if a conditional express a 
proposition with truth-conditions, the degree of confidence in this proposition must be 
measured by its conditional probability .  8
However, the triviality results presented by Lewis  show that this cannot be true. There is 9
no proposition such that the probability of its truth is measured by its conditional probability. 
If there was such proposition, the probability of a conditional would be measured by the 
probability of its consequent, but this is absurd. The probability that the match will light 
given that is struck is not intuitively the same as the probability that it will light . The 10
probability of A → B cannot be the probability of B. Something is wrong. 
 One could object that I’m ignoring conditional-assertion theories in its propositional version. These theories 6
state that A → B is true when A and B are both true; false when A is true and B is false; and has no truth value 
when A is false, regardless of B’s truth value. In other words, if A is false, A → B express no proposition. This 
thesis is defended by Jeffrey (1963); Manor (1974) and McDermott (1996). Stalnaker mentions this hypothesis 
with interest in a footnote, even though he is a not proponent of the theory. See Stalnaker (1975: 137, fn. 2). 
Belnap (1970) also explored the view without endorsing it. The reason why I don’t consider these views as 
versions of conditional-assertion theory is that they don’t capture the intuition that the speech act expressed by 
the consequent can be non-assertive in nature. For instance, it is not obvious that a command or a request can be 
interpreted as having truth-values. Another reason to think that this line of reasoning is not conditional-assertion 
in kind is that it doesn’t interpret conditionals as conditional speech acts, but as categorical assertions that are 
null when the antecedent is false. For this reason, the conditional-assertion theory shouldn’t be confused with 
the view that conditionals express a proposition which has the same truth-value as the consequent if the 
antecedent is true, but which goes truth-valueless where the antecedent is false. Pace Milne (1997) and Lycan 
(2006).
 Derose & Grandy (1999: 410).7
 Jeffrey (1964: 702–703), Adams (1965: 172).8
 Lewis (1976: 299–300).9
 Edgington (1997: 109).10
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This take us to another important argument. Edgington insists that the best way to 
interpret conditionals whose consequents are assertions is not as propositions about facts, but 
as conditional assertion acts. To assert ‘if A, then B’ is to assert B given the assumption of A. 
This is not a categorical assertion that has truth-value, but a conditional assertion of B given 
the assumption A. This explains why the confidence in a conditional is measured by its 
conditional probability, even though it is not equivalent to the probability of a proposition . 11
Edgington also gives importance to the uncertain aspect of the vast majority of 
conditionals. If we ask a specialist about a sentence with the form ‘if A, then B’, her answer 
will not be definitive one, but an answer with a degree of confidence. If we ask a doctor if 
I’m going to survive in case I have an operation, I could hear as an answer ‘It is very likely 
that you survive in case you have the operation’ . In this sense, the uncertainty about 12
conditionals would be in continuity with the uncertainty about propositions in general. Just as 
our best theories about propositions attributes to them the structure of probabilities, our best 
theory about conditional sentences attribute to them the structure of conditional probability . 13
The uncertain state of conditionals is tied to our epistemic limitations. We are not omniscient; 
we are bombarded by epistemic possibilities whose truth interest us. It is in this background 
of imperfect information that conditionals play their part. They express a way of thinking 
about the consequences of a possibility given its assumption and assist us to make 
decisions .  14
This powerful argument is in tune with the ease with which the conditional-assertion 
theory identifies conditional assertion as an element of a more general explanation of 
conditional speech acts. Any type of speech act can be realised unconditionally or 
conditionally. There are conditional commands, questions, promises, etc. The conditional-
assertion theory has the advantage of being capable of explaining conditional assertions as 
just another type of conditional act. For instance, when I say ‘if A, do B’, I’m just giving a 
command that B must be done given the assumption that A .   15
This flexibility of the conditional-assertion theory is usually presented as a triumph over 
rival theories, particularly the material account of conditionals. Suppose that a doctor says to 
the nurse in the emergency ward ‘If the patient is still alive in the morning, change the 
dressing’. If the conditional above is material, it would have the same truth-conditions of 
‘Make it the case that either the patient is not alive in the morning, or you change the 
dressing’. The nurse suffocates the patient with the pillow and kills her. If we accept the 
material account, we could say that the nurse was carrying the doctor’s order, but this is 
absurd . The problem is that the material account cannot be extended to conditional 16
sentences in which the main clause is not an assertion . 17
 Edgington (1986: 17). Edgington purposes a similar explanation to subjunctive conditionals. The only 11
difference in this case is the type of assumption. She defends that when we accept a sentence with the form ‘if A 
were the case, B would be the case’, we are willing to assert that B would be the case given the assumption that 
A is the case, even if we know that A is not the case. Whereas an indicative conditional would also be a 
conditional assertion, but wouldn’t involve the assumption that A is not the case (Cf. Edgington, 1986: 5; 
2008b).
 Edgington (2003: 6).12
 Edgington (1997: 109).13
 Edgington (1986: 4).14
 Edgington (2008a: 302).15
 Edgington (2008a: 302).16
 Edgington (1995: 288).17
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Another problem for the material account involves conditional bets. Suppose that one 
says that ‘If this number is even, I bet it is six’. The result of the draw is five. According to 
the material account, the conditional must be true and I will win the bet, since both 
antecedent and consequent are false, but the intuition says that I did not win the bet, for it was 
canceled . Or suppose that the local zoo bought a new animal and we are wondering what 18
the animal’s name is. I say, ‘If it’s a gorilla, I bet its name is Magilla’ and you bet against. But 
if the new animal is not a gorilla, the bets are off . Again, the material account wrongly 19
predicts that the conditional is vacuously true and that I should win the bet. 
Whatever way we look at it, the conditional-assertion theory is a powerful hypothesis that 
represents a formidable challenge to rival theories. The theory is elegant, flexible and places 
conditional logic at the heart of our epistemic practices. It seems much more appealing than 
rigid formal logics that treat conditionals as functions, especially classical logic.     
3. THE MANY PROBLEMS OF CONDITIONAL-ASSERTION THEORY 
Despite its many strengths, the conditional-assertion view faces numerous attacks. Take for 
instance the accusation that some conditional speech-acts can’t be used in contraposition, 
which is perceived as a valid argumentative form . This would be the case for biscuit 20
conditionals ‘There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some’ . They appear to be 21
contraposition-resistant because they are uttered under the assumption that the consequent is 
true. In this case, the conclusion of the contraposition would be a vacuously true conditional. 
But this interpretation of the example is strange because it suggests that the existence of 
biscuit conditionals on the sideboard has a relevance determined by the truth of the 
antecedent.  
A different formulation of the consequent would make this work, namely, that you would 
like to know that there are biscuits on the sideboard given that you want some biscuits. In this 
case, the complete conditional would be ‘If you want some biscuits, you would like to know 
that there are biscuits on the sideboard’. Notice that in this expanded formulation the 
conditional will be ungrammatical in its original form, ‘You would like to know that there are 
biscuits on the sideboard, if you want some biscuits’. This is understandable since the 
original form was designed to make things easier on the speaker. What is interesting is that in 
this new formulation it becomes clear that neither the consequent nor the antecedent are 
assumed as true, and that the conditional is not contrapositive resistant at all. Thus, from ‘If 
you want some biscuits, you would like to know that there are biscuits on the sideboard’ it 
follows by contraposition that ‘If you wouldn’t like to know that there are biscuits on the 
sideboard, you don’t want some biscuits’. Thus, one of the difficulties of the conditional-
assertion view is explained away.  
Perhaps a better way to test the conditional-assertion theory is by comparing it with our 
intuitions related to categorical assertions. The rationale for this strategy is simple: since a 
conditional assertion amounts to the assertion of a proposition given a certain assumption, 
 McDermott (1996: 20–23).18
 Derose & Grandy (1999: 417).19
 Lycan (2006: 151).20
 The example was first introduced by Austin (1956: 113).21
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they are similar to categorical assertions in the sense that they are also made given certain 
assumptions. This test is also justified by the fact that categorical assertions are better 
understood or at the very least are more accessible than conditionals. This comparison will 
provide us with a dictionary in which intuitions about categorical assertions can be translated 
into intuitions about conditional speech acts. It’s the closest we can get to an independent test. 
Now, suppose you believe that it is going to rain on New York tomorrow because that’s 
the information you found while googling the weather forecast. Then you say, ‘It is going to 
rain on New York tomorrow’, because you believe in the weather forecast. We can represent 
the relation between the belief (or subsequent assertion) and the evidence in this example as 
the conditional ‘It is going to rain on New York tomorrow, if the weather forecast is reliable’. 
The conditional-assertion view predicts that you asserted that it is going to rain on New York 
tomorrow given that the antecedent was true. Otherwise, you didn’t assert anything. This 
prediction is in disagreement with the facts. Suppose that in the example above you made a 
mistake. Perhaps Google’s algorithm malfunctioned and the weather forecast you relied on 
was actually about Jersey City, not New York. Does this mean that you never believed (or 
asserted) that it is going to rain on New York tomorrow? Of course not. Does this mean that 
both your belief and assertion were false? Not necessarily, because you can form a belief or 
make an assertion based on inadequate evidence.  
Or consider Lycan’s objection that ordinary speakers don’t ‘suspend judgment on whether 
any assertion had been made until it had been established whether the antecedent was 
actually true’ . The same can’t be said about categorical assertions. Ordinary speakers make 22
assertions based on assumptions they deem as true. If the assumptions or reasons that 
motivated an assertion turn out to be false, there is an expectation that the rational speaker 
should withdraw her assertion. This strongly suggests that conditionals are not conditional 
speech acts. If they were, the truth of the antecedent would be assumed as true, but is not.  
The conditional-assertion theorist can change her approach to avoid this criticism. She 
can maintain that an antecedent doesn’t need to be assumed as true by the proponent of the 
conditional, rather, it is only required that it should be an epistemic possibility. For instance, 
regarding a carpet that I don’t think is red, I could say, ‘If it is red, I have gone colour-blind 
or am suffering some sort of delusion’ . In this case, I’m not really asserting the consequent 23
under the assumption of the antecedent. Instead, I believe that the antecedent is false even 
though it remains an open possibility. The intuition that supports this modification is that the 
epistemic agent doesn’t actually need to accept the antecedent of a conditional he endorses, 
since it is enough that a hypothetical assumption in an exercise of imagination to decide 
whether she would be willing to assert the consequent. Considering that this exercise of 
imagination is merely momentary, the assertion of the consequent would be merely 
hypothetical. I evaluate whether I would be willing to assert hypothetically the consequent 
given the hypothetical assumption of the antecedent.  
This concession, however, faces more difficulties. It is evident that we can propose many 
conditionals without assuming the antecedent, even hypothetically. When I assert the 
conditional ‘If John’s speaking the truth, I'm a Dutchman’, I’m not asserting that I am a 
Dutchman given the assumption that John is speaking the truth because I take for granted that 
 Lycan (2006: 150)22
 Edgington (1986: 4).23
!6
the antecedent is false. Instead, I want the hearer to infer by modus tollens from the obvious 
falsity of the consequent that the antecedent is false. Conditionals used in reductio ad 
absurdum proofs in mathematics are also counter-examples. Consider this simplified version 
of Euclid's proof of the infinity of primes: ‘If there are only n primes, then there are (n + 1) 
primes; if there are only n primes, then there are not (n + 1) primes; therefore, there are not 
only n primes’ . The conditionals possess the same contradictory antecedent, which are 24
assumed by the reasoner as impossibilities.   
But the coup de grâce against this modified view involves our intuitions about categorical 
assertions. When I assert, ‘It will rain tomorrow’, I make an assertion conditionally to a series 
of assumptions such as ‘The weather forecast is trustworthy’, ‘There are laws of nature’, etc. 
I don’t assert, ‘It will rain tomorrow’ based on hypothetical assumptions, but based on 
categorical assumptions about the world, i.e., beliefs that I do have. Thus, in asserting a 
proposition B from an assumption A, I compromise myself with both the truth of B and A. 
Consequently, if conditionals were conditional assertion acts, the speaker would need to 
accept the truth of both the antecedent and the consequent. This implies that the antecedent of 
a conditional cannot be just an open possibility, or at least it cannot be just an open possibility 
if we insist on the intuition that conditional sentences exhibit a conditional-assertion speech 
act.  
The diagnosis highlights another problem with the conditional-assertion view. The theory 
implies not only that the speaker should accept the antecedent of the conditional she uses, but 
the truth of the consequent as well. This result is intolerable. We don’t think that in order to 
propose or accept a conditional we should compromise ourselves with the truth of both, the 
antecedent and consequent, because conditionals are not conjunctions. There are few 
exceptions, but they involve mostly cases in which the speaker is using a term that adequately 
express her knowledge about the truth value of the constituents involved, e.g., ‘Since she got 
late to the airport, she lost the airplane’. Other suitable examples involve terms such as 
‘Given that A, B’, ‘B, because A’, ‘When A, B’, ‘Despite A, B’, etc .  25
Of course, there are some special cases in which our categorical assertions are 
conditioned to hypothetical assumptions. Take for instance a discussion about epistemology 
when one asserts, ‘I exist’, from a hypothetical assumption that the external world is an 
illusion. But these cases represent just one tiny fraction of categorical assertions in general. 
Thus, it seems safe to admit that assertions in general involve effective assumptions, not 
hypothetical assumptions. 
If conditionals should be interpreted as conditional speech acts, then the performance of a 
conditional should not be judged on whether the antecedent is true or not, since what should 
matter is whether the speaker made the assumption or not. To put it differently, if a 
conditional is a conditional speech act, then the antecedent shouldn’t be judged as an 
assertion that need to be true, but as an action that needs to take place. Take for instance a 
 This version is offered by Jackson (1987: 53). The original proof is in Elements, Book IX, proposition 20.24
 ‘Even-ifs’ admit a similar explanation, although the term can signal different things about the speaker’s 25
expectations in different contexts. In an example such as ‘Even if you offer me a huge pay rise, I shall resign’, it 
expresses the speaker’s belief that he will resign despite the offer, i.e., his confidence in the truth of the 
consequent is independent of the antecedent. But the ‘even’ particle could be dispensed altogether if the context 
is enough to understand the speaker’s beliefs, e.g., ‘If he was surprised, he didn’t show’ (Grice, 1989: 62). In 
some cases, ‘even’ can signal that the consequent is unexpected given the antecedent, e.g., ‘Even being older, 
she is still attractive’.
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conditional A → B with an assertion in the main clause. If we interpret A → B as a 
conditional assertion of B given the assumption A, what it would be required in order for this 
conditional action to take place is the assertion of B given a fact, namely, that the proponent 
of the conditional made the assumption A. The truth value of A shouldn’t matter if 
conditionals were actually actions. This puts a dent in the whole conditional-assertion 
program, because the intuition that motivates the research program only works if their role in 
logic is severely diminished. The concreteness of the theory can only be achieved if truth 
values become irrelevant.  
One way of avoiding this difficulty is to reinterpret the antecedent of the conditional as an 
indirect assertion about the speaker’s assumption. In this case, the antecedent do have a truth 
value that is determined by whether the speaker made the corresponding assumption or not. 
But this seems like a desperation move. If the antecedent can be reinterpreted as an indirect 
assertion about the speaker’s assumption, then the consequent can also be reinterpreted as an 
indirect assertion about the speaker’s speech act. But the conditional-assertion theory 
wouldn’t be content with this concession, since it would diminish the plausibility of the 
program. What is worse is that even if we concede that the antecedent could be reinterpreted 
as an indirect assertion about the speaker’s assumption, we would need to admit the 
embarrassing conclusion that conditionals are always correct. The reason is simple: if the 
antecedent is an indirect assertion about the speaker’s assumption, then it is trivially true, 
because conditional assertions should be by definition conditional actions. Simply put, if A → 
B is a conditional action, then B is performed given an assumption that is expressed indirectly 
by the antecedent, A. Consequently, A will be always true, since the corresponding 
assumption was made by definition, and B holds, because it was an action performed by the 
speaker. The only way to avoid this ridiculous conclusion and still retain the spirit of 
conditional-assertion theory is if we interpret the conditional as an attempt to perform a 
conditional action. This solution is worse than the problem though, because we would have to 
interpret the apparent assertion of conditionals as attempts to perform a conditional action by 
the speaker. How can this conclusion be interpreted as an improvement?    
Another problem with the conditional-assertion theory is that even if we accept for the 
sake of argument that A → B express a conditional assertion of B given A, it is too simplistic 
to accurately represent the role of assumed conditions in speech acts. Let’s say that A → B is 
the assertion of B given the assumption that A is true, but express no assertion otherwise. The 
problem with this picture is that A → B would be not just the assertion of B given the 
assumption that A is true, but the assertion of B given the assumption that A is true and that a 
series of other background assumptions are true. Thus, even if A and B were both true, A → B 
could still be incorrect if some background assumptions don’t obtain. But this is absurd. No 
theory that predicts that A → B is incorrect when A and B are true can be true. Consider the 
conditional ‘If the match is struck then it will light’. This would amount to the assertion that 
the match will light given that the match is struck and other background conditions, i.e., the 
match is dry, there is the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere, etc. But suppose that the 
match is struck and it is held under water, and lights nonetheless due to an addition of a 
mixture of rust and aluminium powder. The conditional-assertion theory in its more 
consequential formulation would have to conclude that the conditional is incorrect, which is 
implausible.  
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One could argue that the conditional-assertion theory has a built-in requirement of 
relevance between the antecedent and the consequent. This would prevent any counter-
examples of this nature . The problem is that chances of developing a general logic system 26
with a connective that is so dependent of assumptions about background conditions are 
virtually nil. The addition of a presupposition of relevance would only complicate things 
even further to the point where logic systems are indistinguishable from individual system of 
beliefs.  
It was mentioned before that categorical speech acts represent a dictionary we can use to 
translate intuitions about conditional speech acts. In a sense they are also a bridge between 
the two of them, and if we cross this bridge accepting the conditional-assertion theory we will 
have to accept bizarre consequences. For instance, anything that was asserted under a false 
assumption should be described as a pseudo-assertion. If we consider that speakers are 
fallible and have plenty of false assumptions about the world, this would imply a radical 
revisionist view about the way we use categorical speech acts. The conditional-assertion 
enthusiast may bite bullet and insist on his view of things, but most people would shy away 
from such a heavy theoretical burden. The reason why the conditional-assertion theory is 
plausible at first sight is that it seems natural when it is applied to a variety of different 
conditionals. But once the consequences of this approach is extended to categorical speech 
acts, the problems become insurmountable.   
The only situation where conditional-assertion theory would work is when the locutionary 
content presupposes the truth of the antecedent . For example, the main clause of the 27
conditional ‘If Sheila owns a heavy overcoat, please borrow it for me’ cannot express a 
request unless the antecedent is true, because you cannot borrow something that doesn’t exist. 
Not surprisingly, this also occurs with categorical speech acts. Suppose I ask you to borrow 
for me Sheila’s heavy overcoat, but it turns out that I made a confusion. What I assumed was 
an overcoat was actually a raincoat. It seems that the request was meaningless because it was 
made under a false presupposition.  
These cases, however, are marginal and don’t represent a problem for the alternative 
views. This becomes clearer when we consider conditionals that contain an assertion in the 
main clause. Suppose one says about a main suspect of a crime ‘If John murdered his wife, he 
should confess to the murder’. Now, if John is actually innocent, the consequent has no truth-
value and the conditional doesn’t express a proposition. Since the conditional doesn’t express 
a proposition, it doesn’t have truth-conditions and it doesn’t represent a counter-example to a 
truth-conditional account of conditionals. Yet even in this small space where the conditional-
assertion is vindicated we still have the intuition that the conditionals involved express a 
relation between the antecedent and the consequent which would be true if the antecedent 
were true. 
 Björnsson (2006: 4-5).26
 The notions of ‘assumption’ and ‘presupposition’ here mean different things. An assumption is a proposition 27
that the speaker assumes as a necessary truth to accept the truth or falsity of another proposition. For instance, 
the assumptions that make me accept the proposition ‘It will rain more in the afternoon’ involve beliefs about 
the last weather forecast and the black clouds on the sky. If these assumptions would turn out to be false, I will 
abandon the proposition that it will rain more in the afternoon. A presupposition is a proposition whose truth is 
necessary to a statement that has truth-conditions. The notion of assumption shouldn’t also be confused with the 
notion of presupposition in the sense intended by Stalnaker (2002: 701), which consists only on assumptions 
shared by both participants in a conversation. 
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Now let’s consider the main merit of the conditional-assertion theory, namely, that it is 
supposed to offer a uniform explanation of conditionals as conditional assertion acts, in the 
same vein of other conditional speech acts, such as conditional commands and promises. This 
is supposed to make the theory more elegant than its rivals, since they are incapable of 
explaining usual conditionals as distinct from other conditional speech acts.  
The best way to object this point is to observe that this aspect makes the conditional-
assertion theory less elegant not more, because it treats conditionals as sui generis 
connectives. If ‘if A, then B’ is a conditional assertion of B given A it involves a compromise 
with the assertion of its propositional constituents. To see why this intuition is false, all we 
need to do is to consider how we assert propositions composed by other connectives. We do 
not accept that the use of conjunction involves the assertion of each conjunct, but we think 
that what is used is just a conjunction as a whole, i.e., the use of A&B does not require the 
assertion of A and the assertion of B. We also do not think that the use of a disjunction 
involves the assertion of each disjunctive because what is used is the disjunction as whole, 
i.e., the use of A ⋁ B does not involve the assertion that A is the case or the assertion that B is 
the case.  
There are also inferences involving both conjunctions and conditionals, or both 
disjunctions and conditionals. But we don’t think that conjunctions or disjunctions are not 
truth-functional. The advantage of being able to explain conditionals as a conditional speech 
act it’s not offset by the inability to explain its relation to connectives that are 
uncontroversially truth-functional.  
Moreover, there are independent reasons to think that the theory fails even in its attempt 
to unify conditionals as just one among other type of conditional speech acts. As explained 
above, there are no good reasons to think that assertive conditionals are conditional assertion 
acts. But since assertive conditionals are not conditional speech acts and intuitively share 
some similarities with other conditional speech acts, then the supposed conditional speech 
acts of another kinds, e.g., conditional commands and conditional promises, are not 
conditional acts at all. If I can accept that ‘if A, then B’ without asserting B or assuming A, 
then I can accept that ‘if A, you must do B’ without commanding B or assuming A, just as I 
can accept ‘if A, then I most promise B’ without promising B or assuming A. Therefore, these 
conditionals can be interpreted as categorical assertions of a relation between the antecedent 
and the consequent. This is not a flattering picture considering that conditional-assertion view 
is supposed to be an improvement over the material account hypothesis. 
4. INHERITING THE FLAWS OF THE RAMSEY TEST 
The Ramsey test states that we accept A → B if, and only if, after the hypothetical addition of 
A to our belief system, and after making the required adjustments to maintain consistency 
without modifying the hypothetical belief in A, we would be willing to accept B . The 28
similarity of the Ramsey test with the conditional-assertion theory is palpable. This implies 
that the explanations in terms of conditional assertion inherit all the problems from the 
Ramsey test.  
 Stalnaker (1968: 102). This is the modified and more widely discussed formulation of the test. The original 28
idea and formulation can be found in Ramsey (1929: 143).
!10
One of the many problems of the Ramsey test is that it is circular. According to the test, in 
order to determine if we should accept a conditional A → B, we should consider whether we 
should infer B after the hypothetical addition of A to our belief system. But the problem is 
that we would only be willing to infer B after hypothetically assuming A if we already have 
independent reasons to accept A → B. In other words, we don’t accept a conditional due to its 
inferential employability on modus ponens, but its inferential employability on modus ponens 
is determined by reasons that we have to accept the conditional.  
Similarly, it could be argued that a conditional A → B doesn’t consist in a conditional 
assertion of B given A. Instead, my willingness to assert B upon learning that A is just a 
consequence of accepting A → B. If I accept a conditional, I would be willing to assert the 
consequent by assuming the antecedent. However, my assertive willingness hinges on the 
acceptance of the conditional. It is not a conditional.  
Another flaw of the Ramsey test is that it is compromised by a modus ponenscentric view 
of conditionals motivated by a directional bias suggested by both the grammatical and logical 
form of conditionals. We are naturally inclined to confuse the truth conditions of A → B with 
the inferential jumps suggested by its logical form. It is natural to think that the acceptability 
of A → B is determined by the Ramsey test because it’s logical form suggests that B can be 
inferred from the assumption of A. That this is a confusion becomes clear when we consider 
that other propositional forms, e.g., ¬A ∨ B, can have the same inferential jumps of A → B, 
but do not cause in us the same intuitions. The reason is that unlike A → B, the logical form 
of ¬A ∨ B does not suggest any inferential jump from A to B, even though they do have the 
same inferential jumps–see the table bellow: 
If the truth of ¬A ∨  B doesn’t require an evaluation with the hypothetical assumption of A, 
then the truth of A → B doesn’t require an evaluation with the hypothetical assumption of A. 
The only reason to think that conditionals are any different is its misleading grammatical and 
logical form, which suggests that its truth is determined by an inferential jump from one of its 
constituent propositions to the other. 
That this mindset is flawed becomes clear when we consider conditionals such as ‘If 
John’s speaking the truth, I'm a Dutchman’. I’m not asserting that I am a Dutchman given the 
assumption that John is speaking the truth. Instead, I’m asserting this conditional with the 
expectation that the hearer will infer by modus tollens the falsity of the consequent from the 
obvious falsity of the consequent. The same criticism can be extended to the conditional-
assertion view. To interpret ‘if A, then B’ as an assertion of B given the acceptance of A is to 
attribute excessive importance to modus ponens. However, is possible to use a similar 
reasoning considering the employability of a conditional in a modus tollens. In this case, the 
A → B ¬A ∨ B
modus ponens disjunctive syllogism
If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did. 
Oswald did not kill Kennedy. 
Thus, someone else killed Kennedy.
Either Oswald killed Kennedy, or someone else 
did. 
Oswald did not kill Kennedy. 
Thus, someone else killed Kennedy.
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intuition behind the conditional assertion of ‘if A then B’ could be just as well be understood 
as a negation of A when B is false .  29
This objection makes it clear that there is a psychologist motivation in the conditional-
assertion view. Conditionals are reduced to acts of conditional assertion, which in turn can be 
reduced to inferential dispositions. This reductionist character explains why the conditional-
assertion view makes our way of speaking about conditionals convoluted and artificial. For 
instance, Edgington states that the degree of confidence of someone in a conditional ‘if A, 
then B’ is the conditional probability that she attributes to B given A. However, this is the 
wrong way of describing the facts accordingly the her own version of conditional-assertion 
view. We cannot speak about the confidence of someone in ‘if A then B’, for according to the 
her theory, a conditional is not a proposition that we can accept in different degrees of 
confidence. Rather, we should say that the degree of confidence in B given A is measured by 
the probability of B given A, but this is a triviality and not an illuminating conclusion.  
In this sense, the conditional-assertion theory can also be considered an error theory. We 
talk about conditionals as if they had truth-conditions, but conditionals are just conditional 
assertion acts. Edgington try to disguise this inconvenient conclusion observing that our 
intuitions about truth-conditions can be translated as intuitions about conditional assertion 
acts, but this translation is not enough to eliminate the tension between the revisionist aspect 
of the theory and our way of speaking about conditionals. Intuitively, we continue to refer 
conditionals as propositional unities and they can be evaluated and discussed without having 
to consider them as conditional assertion acts. If conditionals are not propositions they 
couldn’t be the object of indirect discourse, but they can, as it is evidenced by examples such 
as ‘She believes that if rains, the street will become wet’ . 30
The relationship between conditional assertion and conditional probability faces 
additional problems. On the one hand, it implies that a conditional would only have relevance 
for a speaker when she attributes a probability to the antecedent that is above zero. This is 
also necessary for technical reasons, since is not possible to calculate the conditional 
probability of the consequent given the antecedent if the probability of the antecedent is zero. 
But on the other hand, we have the intuition that conditional probability is primitive and 
shouldn’t be determined as a proposition that we attribute to a proposition given the 
assumption of another, since a person doesn’t need to consider how much A is probable in 
order to decide if B is probable given A . This is an incoherence. If the conditional assertion 31
of B given A is measured by the conditional probability of B given A, then a person wouldn’t 
need to consider how much A is probable in order to decide if she should assert B given A. 
There is something missing in the association between the conditional-assertion view and 
the conditional probability. If A → B is a conditional assertion of B given A, then a speaker 
would need to consider how much A is probable in order to decide if she should assert B 
given A, since assertions are made from assumptions we consider probable. What one could 
object is that there is a difference between assuming and believing. I can assume that A for 
the sake of discussion even though I don’t believe in A. However, if my assumption that A is 
incompatible with my attribution of probability to A, any general observation about my 
 Sanford (2006: 27, fn. 3).29
 Mackie (1973: 102).30
 Edgington (1986: 18).31
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attribution of probability as a whole must be considered with caution and subject to 
contextual interpretation. 
5. THE LOSS OF OBJECTIVITY 
Conditional-assertion theories can also be accused of eliminating the objectivity of 
conditionals. After all, if a conditional is just a conditional act, conditionals express just our 
subjective inferential dispositions, not objective relations between events. The position 
advanced by Edgington in particular deserves special attention, since she anticipate and tries 
to placate these criticisms. Edgington maintains that A → B express a conditional belief of B 
given A, and not belief in a proposition. But she also assures us that we are not at risk of 
losing objectivity, for we can still ensure that a conditional is objectively correct because of 
an objective conditional probability . Suppose that you can choose a ball at random. 90% of 32
red balls have black spots. You can be 90% confident that if you choose a red ball, it will 
have a black spot. The probability of the black spot given that is a red ball is 90%. This is the 
correct opinion, even though no proposition is expressed by the conditional with 90% of 
probability . Therefore, to protect the objectivity of the example is enough simply to hold 33
that the conditional probability must be objective. The objective chances will provide the 
right answers for each case. 
The aim of a logic of conditionals is to guarantee that the objectivity of conditionals are 
preserved by arguments. This objectivity is usually ensured by means of truth-conditions, but 
the conditional-assertion explanation aims to preserve the objectivity by means of an 
alternative, which is the objective conditional probability. However, it is arguable that the 
conditional-assertion theory fails in this aspect, since the objective conditional probability is 
not a proper substitute for truth-conditions. A conditional can have high objective conditional 
probability, but still have a true antecedent and a false consequent. What interest us in this 
case is knowing that if a conditional that is employable on a modus ponens have true 
antecedent and consequent, not if it has high objective conditional probability. In fact, 
objective conditional probability has only relevance insofar as is fallible guide to truth, but it 
can’t be its substitute.  
This becomes clear when consider conditionals that share the same antecedent but 
contradictory consequents, yet still have the same objective conditional probability. Consider 
the toss of a coin in standard conditions. The probability that the side of the coin that is faced-
up is heads or tails given the tossing is the same. Both have a probability of 50%. But should 
we say then that both conditionals ‘if the coin is tossed, the result will be heads’ and ‘if the 
coin is tossed, the result will be tails’ are objectively correct? Of course not, for just one of 
the conditionals would have a true consequent after the toss. What we should say is that 
objective conditional probability doesn’t allow us to decide beyond any doubt which 
conditional is correct. However, after the tossing we will know that only one of them is 
correct, even though the objective conditional probability remains the same. When the 
objective conditional probability and the truth-values of the constituents of a conditional are 
in disagreement, we opt for the second, and these are exactly the circumstances in which 
truth-conditions seem necessary.  
 Edgington (1997: 110).32
 Edgington (1997: 110).33
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Another problem is that the appeal to an objective conditional probability for its own does 
not eliminate the disagreement between two individuals about the same conditional . Two 34
individuals can agree about a relevant objective conditional probability, but disagree about 
the same conditional. Suppose that the objective conditional probability of B given A is 60%, 
i.e., that will rain tomorrow given that we are in March. Someone could accept that will rain 
tomorrow given that we are in March while other could refuse even if both accept that the 
conditional probability is 60%. This suggests that the conditional probability does not ensure 
even the subjective component, which is the acceptance of the conditional.   
The only way to ensure a resemblance of objectivity in the use of conditionals when they 
are interpreted as conditional acts is by a focusing on an entirely different aspect from the one 
proposed by Edgington. What motivates her theory is its aptitude to explain uncertain 
conditionals and their respect attributions of subjective conditional probability. In other 
words, her theory was not formulated having the objectivity of conditionals in mind, but its 
subjective aspects. This raises the suspicion that the mention of objective probability is just 
an insincere attempt to appease the critics, since it isn’t followed by any consistent and 
meaningful use. This is evidenced by the way Edgington explains the examples involved in 
Gibbard stand-offs. Edgington thinks that there is no objectivity between contradictory 
conditionals when the subjective attributions of conditional probability are incompatible. In 
other words, if two incompatible conditional judgments are justified by different points of 
view in the same context, there is no objectively correct conditional judgment. This shows 
that the attribution of conditional probability is a poor substitute of conditional objectivity. 
After all, intuitively, conditionals can express relations between events, and these relations 
are not dependent on epistemic agents’ reasons and their attributions of conditional 
probability. 
6. THE TRIVIALITY RESULT 
It is intuitive to think that the probability of A → B is the probability of B given A . This 35
intuition is known as the equation (TE). Lewis has shown that the acceptance of (TE) implies 
that the probability of A → B is the probability of B. This is implausible. The probability of a 
conditional cannot plausibly be the same as the probability of its consequent, e.g., the 
probability that the match will light given that is struck is not intuitively the same as the 
probability that it will light . Edgington interpreted this result as a support for the belief that 36
conditionals cannot have truth-conditions. The argument is simple: intuitively, the acceptance 
of a conditional is measured by conditional probability, but there is no proposition whose 
probability of truth corresponds to its conditional probability, as have demonstrated Lewis’ 
triviality results .  37
One way to block this argument involves a different interpretation of the triviality result. 
It can argued that the triviality result just shows that conditional probability corresponds to 
the probability that we would attribute to a conditional that we are willing to employ on a 
modus ponens. Our inferential disposition to employ A → B on a modus ponens is measured 
by Pr(A ⊃ B/A), which is equal to Pr(B/A). The proof is as follows: 
 This argument is suggested on a lesson by Geoff Pynn (2011: 5).34
 Jeffrey (1964: 702–703).35
 Lewis (1976: 299–300).36
 Edgington (2005: 51). 37
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This is plausible since the probability that ‘if the match is struck, it will light’ given that ‘the 
match is struck’ is intuitively the same as the probability that the match will light given that is 
struck. In other words, our willingness to accept a material conditional given that its 
antecedent is true is the same as the probability of its consequent given its antecedent.  
Now, the fact that Pr(A → B) = Pr(B/A) implies that Pr(A → B) = Pr(B) is perfectly 
intuitive if TE tracks our inferential disposition to employ A → B on a modus ponens. To 
support this, I propose the following proof: 
From the proof above it follows that Pr(A → B) is tantamount to Pr(A → B/A), which is less 
or equal to Pr(B). The point of this argument is that if Pr(A → B) = Pr(B) is counter-intuitive, 
Pr(A → B) ≤ Pr(B/A) should be equally counter-intuitive, but it isn’t. To see why Pr(A → B) ≤ 
Pr(B) is not counter-intuitive, we only need to consider that Pr(A → B) is tantamount to Pr((A 
⊃ B)/A) given the acceptance of TE, which is less or equal to Pr(B). The probability of ‘if the 
match is struck, it will light’ given that ‘the match is struck’ is less or equal to the probability 
that ‘the match will light’. This is perfectly acceptable. Therefore, Pr(A → B) = Pr(B) 
shouldn’t be considered counter-intuitive given the acceptance of TE.    
The argument for the conditional-assertion view is right in the sense that the willingness 
to employ a conditional in a modus ponens is not a connective with truth-conditions, but we 
can express that inferential disposition as the acceptance of a proposition, namely, (A → B) & 
A. Anyone who is willing to employ a conditional on a modus ponens would not just accept 
that the conditional probability of B given A is high, but also accept (A → B) & A.  
7. CONDITIONAL SPEECH ACTS ARE MATERIAL 
The problem of conditional-assertion theory is that it puts a negligible mental aspect at the 
centre of the debate about conditionals truth-conditions, namely, the assumption of the 
antecedent. The use of conditionals does not require an interpretation in terms of conditional 
speech acts since they are better interpreted as categorical statements of material implication. 
Take for instance the conditional ‘It is going to rain on New York tomorrow, if the weather 
forecast is reliable’. Instead of describing it as a conditional assertion of the consequent given 
the assumption of the antecedent we can interpret it as a categorical assertion about a relation 
1 Pr((¬A ˅ B)/A) = Pr(B/A) since Pr(¬A/A) + Pr(B/A) = Pr(B/A)
2 Pr(A ⊃ B/A) = Pr(B/A)
From 1, given that ¬A ˅ B is logically equivalent to A ⊃ 
B
1 Pr(A → B) = Pr(B/A) TE
2 Pr(B/A) = Pr((¬A ˅ B)/A) since Pr(¬A/A) + Pr(B/A) = Pr(B/A)
3 Pr((¬A ˅ B)/A) = Pr((A ⊃ B)/A) given that A ⊃ B is logically equivalent to ¬A ˅ B
4 Pr(A → B) = Pr((A ⊃ B)/A) from 1 and 3
5 (A ⊃ B) & A ⊨ B given the validity of modus ponens
6 Pr((A ⊃ B)/A) ≤ Pr(B) from 5, for it is irrational to be more confident of 
the premises than of the conclusion
7 Pr(A → B) ≤ Pr(B) from 4 and 6
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between the testimonial evidence and your belief that it is going to rain tomorrow. It is 
natural to assume that this relation will only break if the evidence fails to support or justify 
your belief. This failure will only happen when the weather forecast is reliable and it is not 
going to rain on New York tomorrow. In other words, when the antecedent is true and the 
consequent is false. Otherwise the epistemic relation is preserved. This exactly what would 
happen if conditionals were assertions of material implication. 
The same strategy applies to other conditional speech acts. The truth-value of the 
conditional is about the speaker’s commitment to make an act, not about the acts themselves. 
If the antecedent is false, his commitment is not annulled. Take conditional bets for instance. 
The conditional ‘If the new animal is a gorilla, I bet its name will be Magilla’ should be 
interpreted as follows: The proposition ‘the new animal is a gorilla’ materially implies the 
proposition ‘I bet its name is Magilla’. The conditional itself is not a conditional bet. 
Therefore, the vacuous truth of the conditional due to the falsity of the antecedent does not 
ensure that anyone will win or lose a bet.  
Or let’s consider commands. Suppose a mother order her son to wear his coat because he 
wants to go out. Would we say that no command was made if he decided to stay at home? 
Certainly not. Now, let’s phrase this command in a conditional ‘If you go out, wear your 
coat’. Does it seem likely that the conditional doesn’t contain a command because the 
antecedent turn out to be false? Absolutely not. It is obvious that the locutionary content of 
the main clause of a conditional, whether it is a question, a bet or a request, does not become 
defective when the antecedent is false. The same could be said about the relation between the 
command and the condition under which is assumed. The relation will only break if the son 
go out and doesn’t wear a coat . 38
Now, let’s consider the argument that conditional speech acts are unlike conjunctions and 
disjunctions. The conditional warning ‘If you go to New York, watch out for the taxi drivers’, 
would have nothing to do with ‘You are going to New York and watch out for the taxi drivers’ 
and ‘You are not going to New York or watch out for the taxi drivers’. But the present 
account can explain why this is not the case. The conditional warning can be interpreted as 
saying that the statement ‘you go to New York’ materially implies ‘watch out for the taxi 
drivers’. This assertion of material implication is logically equivalent to their respective 
conjunction and disjunction sentences when they are properly formulated, namely, ‘It is not 
the case that you go to New York and don’t watch out for the taxi drivers’  and ‘Or you don't 39
go to New York, or you watch out for the taxi drivers’.     
And what can we say about the counter-example of the nurse? The doctor says to the 
nurse in the emergency room ‘If the patient is still alive in the morning, change the dressing’. 
If the conditional is material, the falsity of the antecedent would be sufficient to make the 
conditional true. However, we don’t think that if the nurse would be obeying the order if she 
had suffocated the patient with a pillow. What went wrong? The answer to this objection is 
that a nurse that killed her patient would disobey the tacit presumption that she should 
preserve the patient’s life. However, she certainly couldn’t be accused of disobeying that 
specific command given by the doctor, for this would only be possible if the antecedent were 
 See also Kleene (1967), Nelson (1993) and Hutchins (2006) for a similar argument involving conditional 38
promises.
 Of course, in this case the relevant conjunction is under the scope of a negation, but this is not a problem 39
because that’s the relationship between the two according to the material account.
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true. The command would only be carried out if the nurse changed the dressing; and it would 
only be disobeyed if the patient had been alive in the morning and the nurse didn’t change the 
dressing. 
It is interesting to observe that even Edgington who advanced these very criticisms 
against the material account ignores this subtlety when she accepts that a conditional 
command would be equivalent to the following disjunction if it were material, ‘Make it that 
the patient isn’t alive in the morning, or change the dressing’ . However, we cannot assume 40
that the command has a scope over the conditional, for in this case we wouldn’t had a 
conditional command, but a command that would satisfy the truth-conditions of a 
proposition. Once this mistake is undone, it becomes clear that the disjunction must assume a 
different form, namely, ‘Either the patient will not be alive in the morning, or you must 
change the dressing’. In this case, the death of the patient confirms the disjunction, since it 
make it true one of the disjunctives. Therefore, killing the patient cannot be interpreted as a 
way of disobeying the doctor’s command, but a bizarre way to ensure the truth of the 
disjunction while ignoring the duties of a healthcare profession. 
One decisive argument for the thesis that conditional commands are material is that is 
possible to find examples that are intuitively valid with the inferential form ‘or-to-if’. Since 
this inferential form implies the material account , it also implies that commands are 41
material. For instance, ‘Close the door, or leave now! Therefore, if you don’t close the door, 
leave now!’. The same reasoning holds for the other types of conditional speech acts. The 
negation of a conditional command resembles the negation of a material implication. The 
negation of ‘If you aren’t going to close that door, leave now!’ is not ‘If you aren’t going to 
close that door, don’t leave now!’, but ‘You are not going to close that door and don’t leave 
now’. This means that the conditional command will only be falsified in the circumstances 
that correspond to the second line of the truth-table of material implication. 
It’s important to observe that someone can admit that conditional sentences that contain 
commands and promises in their main clauses are assertions, but still refuse that commands 
and promises are assertions. It is possible to accept that a conditional such as ‘If Mark shows 
up late, you shouldn’t let him in’ is an assertion that can express a relation between a 
command and a condition, but deny that the command itself is an assertion. The assertion of 
‘if A, then B’ doesn’t involve the assertion of neither A, nor B. Similarly, the assertion of ‘if A, 
then do B’, doesn’t involve the assertion of neither A, nor ‘do B’. 
However, it is more reasonable to explain all these speech acts as assertions, without 
qualifications . Of course, this is a controversial topic. It seems implausible that a question 42
such as ‘Can you hear me now?’ can be interpreted as an assertion, but this implausibility 
tells more about our grammatical habits than the real nature of linguistic act in itself. This 
 Edgington (2008a: 302).40
 Or any other conditional speech act for that matter. The proof is as follows: 41
Prem (1) ¬A v B ⊨ A → B (Or-to-If) 
Prem (2) A ⊃ B ≡ ¬A v B given the truth conditions of  ‘⊃’ 
1,2     (3) A ⊃ B ⊨ A → B 1,2 transitivity of entailment 
Sup    (4) A → B ⊨ A ⊃ B given the validity of modus ponens for ‘→’ 
1,4     (5) A → B ≡ A ⊃ B 3,4 mutual entailment
 Or at least as involving two speech acts simultaneously, for instance, a command would be a command and an 42
assertion, etc. See Ginet (1979: 246) and Bach (1975: 233). However, this is implausible. There is no reason to 
think this way besides an indulgent attitude regarding grammatical habits.
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becomes more clear if we consider which questions are plausibly translatable as assertions 
about the intentions of the speaker, for instance, the question ‘Can you hear me now?’ can be 
translated as ‘I would like to know whether you can hear me now’, which is an assertion in its 
own right. The same explanation holds for commands, promises, etc. In fact, it would be 
impossible to explain communication involving these speech acts if they didn’t involve an 
assertion that is communicated by the speaker.  
Another reason to think that these speech acts are propositions is that conditionals that 
contain can be employed in inferential forms. For instance, a conditional command can be 
used in a modus tollens, ‘If he is late, don’t let him in. You let him in. Therefore, he wasn’t 
late’ or in a modus ponens, ‘if Mark show up late, you shouldn’t let him in. Mark show up 
late. Therefore, you shouldn’t let him in’. Just as an assertion, a conditional speech act can 
also be the object of indirect quotes, for instance, ‘John said that if Mark show up late, you 
shouldn’t let him in’ and can also be embedded, e.g., ‘In case Mark doesn’t provide a 
justification, if he shows up late, you shouldn’t let him in’. It’s hard to explain these 
similarities if conditional speech acts were not assertions.   
This argumentation shows that the supposed differences between speech acts such as bets, 
promises and questions and assertions were greatly exaggerated. In fact, what is striking is 
not that the conditionals that are usually interpreted as assertions can be perceived as similar 
to different conditional speech acts, but that these speech acts were considered distinct from 
assertions in the first place. More importantly, it suggests that the material account can 
explain these conditionals as assertions of material implication. 
8. WHAT SHOULD WE MAKE OF THIS 
The notion that we have a group of abnormal conditionals that requires an entirely different 
approach should be greeted with some initial skepticism. Alternative hypothesis should be 
perceived as the last resort to be adopted only after all the theoretical resources available 
failed. The conditional-assertion theory is motivated by an incomprehension of the data and 
doesn’t deliver what it promised. It doesn’t explain the connectives in an elegant fashion and 
it generates its own problems. These problems would be substantial for any theory, but have 
even more force against the conditional-assertion theory since it is a radical revisionist view. 
This hypothesis want us to believe that we should change the way we see one of the key 
connectives in logic. That’s too much to ask and she offered us little in return.  
The main problem with conditional-assertion theory is that it treats the communicative 
purposes of ordinary language as a reliable guide to the nature of conditionals. To see why 
this is the wrong way of looking at things, consider how we interpret the use of arguments. 
Reasoners usually expect that the premises should be relevant to the conclusion. This is their 
purpose while using an argument. Yet no one would think that the classical conception of 
validity should be revised to fit these argumentative purposes. Instead, we should argue that 
there is a distinction between the technical sophisticated notion of validity and our common 
purposes while using deductive arguments. Similarly, speakers may have different 
communicative purposes while using conditionals, but we should still maintain a distinction 
between the technical sophisticated notion of material implication and our common purposes 
while using conditionals. This is a discussion about the logic of conditionals, not about the 
nature of our communicative purposes when using conditionals.  
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